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Abstract
The wiretap channel is a setting where one aims to provide information-theoretic privacy of
communicated data based solely on the assumption that the channel from sender to adversary is
“noisier” than the channel from sender to receiver. It has been the subject of decades of work in
the information and coding (I&C) community. This paper bridges the gap between this body of
work and modern cryptography with contributions along two fronts, namely metrics (definitions)
of security, and schemes. We explain that the metric currently in use is weak and insufficient to
guarantee security of applications and propose two replacements. One, that we call mis-security, is
a mutual-information based metric in the I&C style. The other, semantic security, adapts to this
setting a cryptographic metric that, in the cryptography community, has been vetted by decades
of evaluation and endorsed as the target for standards and implementations. We show that they
are equivalent (any scheme secure under one is secure under the other), thereby connecting two
fundamentally different ways of defining security and providing a strong, unified and well-founded
target for designs. Moving on to schemes, results from the wiretap community are mostly non-
constructive, proving the existence of schemes without necessarily yielding ones that are explicit,
let alone efficient, and only meeting their weak notion of security. We apply cryptographic methods
based on extractors to produce explicit, polynomial-time and even practical encryption schemes
that meet our new and stronger security target.
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1 Introduction
This paper aims to bridge the gap between two communities. The first, within information and coding
(I&C), is the wiretap channel community, and the second is the modern cryptographic community.
The wiretap channel is a setting where one aims to communicate data with information-theoretic
security under the sole assumption that the channel from sender to adversary is “noisier” than the
channel from sender to receiver. Introduced byWyner, Csisza´r and Ko¨rner in the late seventies [45, 14],
it has developed in the I&C community over the last 30 years divorced from the parallel development
of Modern Cryptography. Yet the questions, centering as they are on data security, are at heart
cryptographic.
The first element of the gap is definitions. We explain that the security definition in current use,
that we call mis-r (mutual-information security for randommessages) is weak and insufficient to provide
security of applications. We suggest strong, new definitions. One, that we call mis (mutual-information
security), is an extension of mis-r and thus rooted in the I&C tradition and intuition. Another,
semantic security, adapts a definition of [19, 2] that, vetted by decades of cryptographic research and
targeted by standards and schemes deployed in practice, is the cryptographic gold standard. We
prove the two equivalent, thereby connecting two fundamentally different ways of defining privacy and
providing a new, strong and well-founded target for constructions.
The second element of the gap is techniques. The I&C community tends to view security as an add-
on to error-correction, starting from error-correcting codes (ECCs) and tweaking the designs to confer
security. Their results are mostly non-constructive, proving existence of schemes whose algorithms
may not be efficient. Meanwhile, complexity-theorists and cryptographers have developed tools such
as extractors which would seem eminently useful in this domain, even more so when one aims to achieve
the new and more stringent definitions of privacy that we define. With this starting point, we take
the opposite approach, making error-correction an add-on to security. We start from cryptographic
tools to provide the security, error-correction being done later for no purpose other than correcting
errors. We obtain constructive results which yield practical schemes to achieve all the security goals
we define. Let us now look at all this in more detail.
The wiretap model. The setting is depicted in Figure 1. The sender applies to her message M
a randomized encryption function E : {0, 1}m → {0, 1}c to get what we call the sender-ciphertext
X←$ E(M).1 This is transmitted to the receiver over the receiver channel ChR so that the latter
gets a receiver ciphertext Y←$ ChR(X) which it decrypts via algorithm D to recover the message. The
adversary’s wiretap is modeled as another channel ChA and it accordingly gets an adversary ciphertext
Z←$ ChA(X) from which it tries to glean whatever it can about the message.
A channel is a randomized function specified by a transition probability matrix W where W [x, y]
is the probability that input x results in output y. Here x, y are strings. Thus, for example, we regard
the Binary Symmetric Channel BSCp with crossover probability p ≤ 1/2 as taking a binary string x of
any length and returning the string y of the same length formed by flipping each bit of x independently
with probability p. For concreteness and simplicity of exposition we will often phrase discussions in
the setting where ChR,ChA are BSCs with crossover probabilities pR, pA ≤ 1/2 respectively, but our
results apply in much greater generality. In this case the assumption that ChA is “noisier” than ChR
corresponds to the assumption that pR < pA. This is the only assumption made: the adversary is
computationally unbounded, and the scheme is keyless, meaning sender and receiver are not assumed
to a priori share any information not known to the adversary.
Previous work. The setting now has a literature, in the I&C community, encompassing hundreds
of papers. (See the survey [27] or the book [5].) Schemes must satisfy two conditions, namely decoding
and security. The decoding condition asks that the scheme provide error-correction over the receiver
channel, namely limm→∞ Pr[D(ChR(E(M))) 6= M] = 0. The original security condition of [45] was
1 (The notation y←$ A(x) means that we run randomized function A on input x and denote the output by y.
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Figure 1: Wiretap channel model. See text for explanations.
that limk→∞ I(M;ChA(E(M))/m = 0 where k is an underlying security parameter of which m, c are
functions, the message random variable M is uniformly distributed over {0, 1}m and I(M;Z) = H(M)−
H(M |Z) is the mutual information. This was critiqued by [32, 36] who put forth the stronger security
condition now in use, namely that limk→∞ I(M;ChA(E(M)) = 0. (The random variable M continues
to be uniformly distributed over {0, 1}m.) The literature seeks to minimize the rate Rate(E) = m/c
of the scheme.
Shannon’s seminal result [41] says that if we ignore security and merely consider achieving the
decoding condition then the maximum achievable rate Rate(E) is the receiver channel capacity, which
in the BSC case is 1−h2(pR) where h2 is the binary entropy function h2(p) = −p lg(p)−(1−p) lg(1−p).
He gave non-constructive proofs of existence of schemes meeting capacity.
Coming in with this background and the added security condition, it was natural for the wiretap
community to follow Shannon’s lead and begin by asking what is the maximum achievable rate, now
subject to both the security and decoding conditions. This optimal rate is called the secrecy capacity
and, in the case of BSCs, equals the difference (1 − h2(pR)) − (1 − h2(pA)) = h2(pA) − h2(pR) in
capacities of the receiver and adversary channels. Non-constructive proofs of the existence of schemes
with this optimal rate were given in [45, 14, 6]. A lot of work has followed aiming to establish similar
results for other channels. Little attention has been given to finding explicit schemes with efficient
encoding and decoding.
Context. Practical interest in the wiretap setting is escalating. Its proponents note two striking
benefits over conventional cryptography: (1) no computational assumptions, and (2) no keys and
hence no key distribution. Item (1) is attractive to governments who are concerned with long-term
security and worried about quantum computing. Item (2) is attractive in a world where vulnerable,
low-power devices are proliferating and key-distribution and key-management are unsurmountable
obstacles to security. The practical challenge is to realize a secrecy capacity, meaning ensure by
physical means that the adversary channel is noisier than the receiver one. The degradation with
distance of radio communication signal quality is the basis of several approaches being investigated
for wireless settings. Government-sponsored Ziva Corporation [46] is using optical techniques to build
a receiver channel in such a way that wiretapping results in a degraded channel. A program called
Physical Layer Security aimed at practical realization of the wiretap channel is the subject of books [5]
and conferences [22]. All this activity means that schemes are being sought for implementation. If
so, we need privacy definitions that yield security in applications, and we need constructive results
yielding practical schemes achieving privacy under these definitions. This is what we aim to supply.
Definitions. A security metric xs associates to encryption function E : {0, 1}m → {0, 1}c and ad-
versary channel ChA a number Advxs(E ;ChA) that measures the maximum “advantage” of an ad-
versary in breaking the scheme under metric xs. For example, the metric underlying the current,
above-mentioned security condition is Advmis-r(E ;ChA) = I(M;ChA(E(M))) where M is uniformly
distributed over {0, 1}m. We call this the mis-r (mutual-information security for random messages)
metric because messages are assumed to be random. From the cryptographic perspective, this is ex-
traordinarily weak, for we know that real messages are not random. (They may be files, votes or any
type of structured data, often with low entropy. Contrary to a view in the I&C community, compres-
sion does not render data random, as can be seen from the case of votes, where the message space
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1 ǫds ≤
√
2ǫmis Theorem 4.5
2 ǫmis ≤ 2ǫds lg 2cǫds Theorem 4.9
3 ǫss ≤ ǫds Theorem 4.1
4 ǫds ≤ 2ǫss Theorem 4.1
Figure 2: Relations between notions. An arrow A→ B is an implication, meaning every scheme
that is A-secure is also B-secure, while a barred arrow A 6→ B is a separation, meaning that there is
a A-secure scheme that is not B-secure. If E : {0, 1}m → {0, 1}c is the encryption function and ChA
the adversary channel, we let ǫxs = Adv
xs(E ;ChA). The table then shows the quantitative bounds
underlying the annotated implications.
has very low entropy.) This leads us to suggest a stronger metric that we call mutual-information se-
curity, defined via Advmis(E ;ChA) = maxM I(M;ChA(E(M))) where the maximum is over all random
variables M over {0, 1}m, regardless of their distribution.
At this point, we have a legitimate metric, but how does it capture privacy? The intuition is
that it is measuring the difference in the number of bits required to encode the message before and
after seeing the ciphertext. This intuition is alien to cryptographers, whose metrics are based on
much more direct and usage-driven privacy requirements. Cryptographers understand since [19] that
encryption must hide all partial information about the message, meaning the adversary should have
little advantage in computing a function of the message given the ciphertext. (Examples of partial
information about a message include its first bit or even the XOR of the first and second bits.) The
mis-r and mis metrics ask for nothing like this and are based on entirely different intuition. We extend
Goldwasser and Micali’s semantic security [19] definition to the wiretap setting, defining
Advss(E ;ChA) = max
f,M
(
max
A
Pr[A(ChA(E(M))) = f(M)]−max
S
Pr[S(m) = f(M)]
)
.
Within the parentheses is the maximum probability that an adversary A, given the adversary cipher-
text, can compute the result of function f on the message, minus the maximum probability that a
simulator S can do the same given only the length of the message. We also define a distinguishing
security (ds) metric as an analog of indistinguishability [19] via
Advds(E ;ChA) = max
A,M0,M1
2Pr[A(M0,M1,ChA(E(Mb))) = b]− 1
where challenge bit b is uniformly distributed over {0, 1} and the maximum is over all m-bit mes-
sages M0,M1 and all adversaries A. For any metric xs, we say E provides XS-security over ChA if
limk→∞Adv
xs(E ;ChA) = 0.
Relations. The mutual information between message and ciphertext, as measured by mis, is, as
noted above, the change in the number of bits needed to encode the message created by seeing the
ciphertext. It is not clear why this should measure privacy in the sense of semantic security. Yet
we are able to show that mutual-information security and semantic security are equivalent, meaning
an encryption scheme is MIS-secure if and only if it is SS-secure. Figure 2 summarizes this and
other relations we establish that between them settle all possible relations. The equivalence between
SS and DS is the information-theoretic analogue of the corresponding well-known equivalence in the
computational setting [19, 2]. As there, however, it brings the important benefit that we can now
work with the technically simpler DS. We then show that MIS implies DS by reducing to Pinsker’s
inequality. We show conversely that DS implies MIS via a general relation between mutual information
and statistical distance. As Figure 2 indicates, the asymptotic relations are all underlain by concrete
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quantitative and polynomial relations between the advantages.
We show that in general MIS-R does not imply MIS, meaning the former is strictly weaker than
the latter. We do this by exhibiting an encryption function E and channel ChA such that E is MIS-
R-secure relative to ChA but MIS-insecure relative to ChA. Furthermore we do this for the case that
ChA is a BSC. However in Section 4.6 we show that for certain encryption schemes, namely ones that
are separable and message-linear, and for certain channels, MIS-R security does imply MIS-security.
This somewhat surprising result has been exploited in [29, 28] to build MIS-secure schemes.
Schemes. We improve over existing schemes in several ways. First, while previous work targeted
MIS-R security, we target and achieve the stronger MIS, DS and SS goals. Second, while previous
results were largely proving existence of schemes without giving explicit ones, our schemes are not
only explicit but have efficient and simple encryption and decryption and may be used in the practical
settings that are now emerging in this area. Third, the methods of previous work were ECC-intrusive,
taking ECCs and modifying them to add security. Our approach is modular, combining extractors
with existing ECCs.
A common misconception is to think that privacy and error-correction may be completely de-
coupled, meaning one would first build a scheme that is secure when the receiver channel is noiseless
and then add an ECC on top to meet the decoding condition with a noisy receiver channel. This does
not work because the error-correction helps the adversary by reducing the noise over the adversary
channel. The two requirements do need to be considered together. We are still, however, able to provide
a modular approach. First designing secure schemes for the case of a noiseless receiver channel, we
then put ECCs on top for error-correction, but we are able to state certain simple conditions on the
ECCs that suffice for preservation of security, and provide non-intrusive analyses showing that most
ECCs have these properties.
Let H: {0, 1}h ×{0, 1}u → {0, 1}m be a universal hash function. In the case of a noiseless receiver
channel, our scheme, given a m-bit message M , picks at random a h-bit string H and u-bit string
U , and sets the sender ciphertext to U‖H‖H(H,U)⊕M . Using the extraction properties of universal
hash functions established by the Leftover Hash Lemma [20] and its generalization [16, 15] we can
bound the DS-advantage of this scheme in terms of the probability that the adversary, given the
adversary ciphertext, recovers U . This probability can in turn be bounded for specific channels like
the BSC. In the case the receiver channel has error, we apply an ECC to U to get U ′, apply an
ECC to H‖H(H,U)⊕M to get V ′ and let the sender ciphertext be U ′‖V ′. In this case we bound
the DS-advantage of this scheme in terms of what we call the rs-r-advantage of the first ECC, which
is the probability that an adversary, given the result of the adversary channel on U ′, can recover U .
This probability too can be bounded directly for BSCs. We also provide tools to bound it for other
channels. Our approach for the case of a noisy receiver channel is inspired by the concepts of secure
sketches and fuzzy extractors [16, 15], translating ideas there to the wiretap setting.
Related work. Mahdavifar and Vardy [28, 29] provide an explicit MIS-R-secure scheme with optimal
rate, meaning rate equal to the MIS-R secrecy capacity. But they give no proof that decryption
(decoding) is possible for their scheme, even in principle let alone in polynomial time. The central
open question in the wiretap channel community was whether there is a polynomial time (this means
both encryption and decryption are polynomial time) MIS-R secure scheme with optimal rate. Our
schemes achieve MIS-R security in polynomial time but do not have optimal rate, so we do not answer
this question. The question has finally been settled by [3], who provide a polynomial-time MIS-R
secure scheme with optimal rate.
Mahdavifar and Vardy [28, 29] apply our results from Section 4.6 to conclude that their MIS-R
secure scheme also provides MIS (and thus by our results DS and SS) security for certain channels.
This shows that the optimal rate for DS-security is the same as for MIS-R security for these channels.
The question this raises is whether one can achieve DS-security at this optimal rate in polynomial
time. This question too is resolved by [3], whose above-mentioned scheme in fact directly achieves
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DS-security.
Appendix A provides a comprehensive survey of the large body of work related to wiretap security,
and more broadly, to information-theoretic secure communication in a noisy setup [30].
2 Preliminaries
Basic notation and definitions. If s is a binary string then s[i] denotes its i-th bit and |s| denotes
its length. If S is a set then |S| denotes its size. If x is a real number then |x| denotes its absolute
value. If s1, . . . , sl are strings then s1‖ · · · ‖sl denotes their concatenation. If s is a string and n a
non-negative integer then sn denotes the concatenation of n copies of s.
A probability distribution is a function P that associates to each x a probability P (x) ∈ [0, 1]. The
support supp(P ) is the set of all x such that P (x) > 0. All probability distributions in this paper
are discrete. Associate to random variable X and event E the probability distributions PX ,PX|E
defined for all x by PX(x) = Pr [X = x ] and PX|E(x) = Pr [ X = x | E ]. We denote by lg(·) the
logarithm in base two, and by ln(·) the natural logarithm. We adopt standard conventions such as
0 lg 0 = 0 lg∞ = 0 and Pr[E1|E2] = 0 when Pr[E2] = 0. The function h: [0, 1] → [0, 1] is defined by
h(x) = −x lg x. The (Shannon) entropy of a probability distribution P is defined by
H(P ) =
∑
x
h(P (x)) = −
∑
x
P (x) lg P (x)
The (Shannon) entropy of a random variable X is defined by
H(X) = H(PX) =
∑
x
h(PX(x)) .
The statistical difference between probability distributions P,Q is defined by
SD(P ;Q) =
1
2
·
∑
x
|P (x)−Q(x)| .
The statistical difference between random variables X,Y is defined by
SD(X1;X2) = SD(PX1 ;PX2) =
1
2
·
∑
x
|Pr[X1 = x]− Pr[X2 = x]| .
If X,Y are random variables the conditional entropy is defined via
H(X |Y) =
∑
y
PY(y) ·H(X |Y = y) where H(X |Y = y) =
∑
x
h(PX|Y=y(x)) .
The mutual information between random variables X,Y is defined by
I(X;Y) = H(X)−H(X |Y) .
The guessing-probability GP and min-entropy H∞ of a random variable X are defined via
GP(X) = max
x
Pr[X = x] = 2−H∞(X) .
The average guessing probability GP(X|Z) and average min-entropy H∞(X|Z) are defined for random
variables X,Z via
GP(X|Z) =
∑
z
Pr [Z = z ] ·max
x
Pr [ X = x | Z = z ] = 2−H∞(X|Z) .
Transforms. We say that T is a transform with domain D and range R, written T : D → R, if T (x)
is a random variable over R for every x ∈ D. Thus, T is fully specified by a sequence P = {Px}x∈D of
probability distributions over R, where Px(y) = Pr[T (x) = y] for all x ∈ D and y ∈ R. We call P the
distribution associated to T . This distribution can be specified by a |D| by |R| transition probability
matrix W defined by W [x, y] = Px(y). An adversary too is a transform, and so is a simulator.
Channels. A channel is, again, just a transform. In more conventional communications terminology,
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a channel Ch: D → R has input alphabet D and output alphabet R.
If B: D → Z is a channel and c ≥ 1 is an integer we define the channel Bc: {0, 1}c → Zc by Bc(X) =
B(X[1])‖ · · · ‖B(X[c]) for all X = X[1] . . . X[c] ∈ {0, 1}c. The applications of B are all independent,
meaning that if W is the transition probability matrix of B then the transition probability matrix Wc
of Bc is defined by W [X,Y ] =W [X[1], Y [1]] · . . . ·W [X[c], Y [c]] for all X = X[1] . . . X[c] ∈ {0, 1}c and
Y = Y [1] . . . Y [c] ∈ Zc. We say that a channel Ch is binary if it equals Bc for some channel B and
some c, in which case we refer to B as the base (binary) channel and Ch as the channel induced by B.
By BSCp: {0, 1} → {0, 1} we denote the binary symmetric channel with crossover probability p
(0 ≤ p ≤ 1/2). Its transition probability matrix W has W [x, y] = p if x 6= y and 1 − p otherwise for
all x, y ∈ {0, 1}. The induced channel BSCcp flips each input bit independently with probability p.
The receiver and adversary channels of the wiretap setting will have domain {0, 1}c, where c is the
length of the sender ciphertext, and range {0, 1}d, where the output length d may differ between the
two channels. Such channels may be binary, which is the most natural example, but our equivalences
between security notions hold for all channels, even ones that are not binary.
If Ch1: {0, 1}c1 → {0, 1}d1 and Ch2: {0, 1}c2 → {0, 1}d2 are channels then Ch1‖Ch2 denotes the
channel Ch: {0, 1}c1+c2 → {0, 1}d1+d2 defined by Ch(x1‖x2) = Ch1(x1)‖Ch2(x2) for all x1 ∈ {0, 1}c1
and x2 ∈ {0, 1}c2 . We say that a channel Ch: {0, 1}c → {0, 1}d is (c1, c2)-splittable if there are channels
Ch1: {0, 1}c1 → {0, 1}d1 and Ch2: {0, 1}c2 → {0, 1}d2 such that Ch = Ch1‖Ch2.
For any integer s we let Ids: {0, 1}s → {0, 1}s denote the identity function defined by Ids(x) = x
for all x ∈ {0, 1}s. This represents a clear channel.
We say that a channel Ch: D → R with transition matrix W is symmetric if the there exists a
partition of the range as R = R1 ∪ · · · ∪Rn such that for all i the sub-matrix W [·, Ri] induced by the
rows in Ri is strongly symmetric, i.e., all rows are permutations of each other, and all columns are
permutations of each other.
Algorithms. We sometimes describe a transform (for example an encryption function or an adver-
sary) algorithmically. In this view, a transform T takes inputX and coins R to deterministically return
an output Y ← T (X;R). By Y ←$ T (X) we mean that we pick R at random and let Y ← T (X;R).
The probability that a particular Y is produced by this process is W [X,Y ] where W is the transition
probability matrix associated to transform T . As an example, we could specify T by saying that on
input X and coins R, these being strings of the same length m, it returns X⊕R. Then Y ←$ T (X)
means that we pick R at random and let Y = X⊕R, and the transition probability matrix W is a 2m
by 2m matrix all of whose entries equal 2−m. If S is a (finite) set then s←$ S denotes the operation
of picking a point at random from S and denoting it s.
3 Security metrics
3.1 Encryption functions and schemes
An encryption function is a transform E : {0, 1}m → {0, 1}c where m is the message length and c is the
sender ciphertext length. The rate of E isRate(E) = m/c. If ChR: {0, 1}c → {0, 1}d is a receiver chan-
nel then a decryption function for E over ChR is a transform D: {0, 1}d → {0, 1}m whose decryption
error DE(E ;D;ChR) is defined as the maximum, over all M ∈ {0, 1}m, of Pr[D(ChR(E(M))) 6=M ].
An encryption scheme E = {Ek}k∈N is a family of encryption functions where Ek: {0, 1}m(k) →
{0, 1}c(k) for functions m, c: N → N called the message length and sender ciphertext lengths of the
scheme. The rate of E is the function RateE : N→ R defined by RateE(k) = Rate(Ek) for all k ∈ N.
Suppose ChR = {ChRk}k∈N is a family of receiver channels where ChRk: {0, 1}c(k) → {0, 1}d(k). Then
a decryption scheme for E over ChR is a family D = {Dk}k∈N where Dk: {0, 1}d(k) → {0, 1}m(k) is a
decryption function for Ek over ChRk. We say that D is a correct decryption scheme for E relative
to ChR if limk→∞DE(Ek;Dk;ChRk) = 0. We say that encryption scheme E is decryptable relative to
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ChR if there exists a correct decryption scheme for E relative to ChR.
This standard requirement from the I&C literature is, however, weak in that the rate at which
the decryption error approaches zero could be very slow. For example, it would be met when
DE(Ek;Dk;ChRk) = 1/ lg k. We propose a stronger requirement, namely that the decryption er-
ror vanish exponentially in k. Thus we say that D is a correct strong decryption scheme for E relative
to ChR if there are constants d, ǫ > 0 such that − lg(DE(Ek;Dk;ChRk)) ≥ dkǫ for all k ∈ N. We
say that encryption scheme E is strongly decryptable relative to ChR if there exists a correct strong
decryption scheme for E relative to ChR.
We say that a family {Sk}k∈N (eg. an encryption or decryption scheme) is polynomial-time com-
putable if there is a polynomial time computable function which on input 1k (the unary representation
of k) and x returns Sk(x).
3.2 Security metrics
We are interested in measuring the security providing by an encryption function E : {0, 1}m → {0, 1}c
relative to an adversary channel ChA: {0, 1}c → {0, 1}d. (The receiver channel is not relevant to
security.) A security metric xs associates to E ;ChA a real number Advxs(E ;ChA). Intuitively, the
latter is the amount of “information” about the message M, as measured by metric xs, that is present
in the adversary ciphertext ChA(E(M)). The smaller this number, the more secure is E ;ChA according
to the metric in question. The metrics we will define are semantic security (ss), distinguishing security
(ds), mutual-information security (mis) and mutual-information security for random messages (mis-r).
In cryptography it is customary to measure security in bits, saying that E ;ChA has s bits of xs-
security ifAdvxs(E ;ChA) ≤ 2−s. There is no formal definition of an encryption function being “secure”
or “insecure,” security rather being quantitative, given by a certain number of bits. A qualitative
definition of “secure,” meaning one under which something is secure or not secure, may only be made
asymptotically, meaning for schemes. We say that encryption scheme E = {Ek}k∈N is XS-secure relative
to ChA = {ChAk}k∈N if limk→∞Advxs(Ek;ChAk) = 0. We say E = {Ek}k∈N is strongly XS-secure
relative to ChA = {ChAk}k∈N if there are constants ǫ, d > 0 such that − lgAdvxs(Ek;ChAk) ≥ dkǫ for
all k ∈ N.
With encryption function E : {0, 1}m → {0, 1}c and adversary channel ChA: {0, 1}c → {0, 1}d
fixed, we now move to defining the above-mentioned metrics.
3.3 Mutual-information metrics
We dub the metric in current use mutual-information security for random messages (mis-r). The
corresponding advantage is defined via
Advmis-r(E ;ChA) = I(U;ChA(E(U))) (1)
where the random variable U is uniformly distributed over {0, 1}m. The weakness of this metric is that
it only considers uniformly distributed messages. Yet “real” messages are not uniformly distributed.
Indeed, they may be drawn from small and structured spaces. They may be English text. They may
take only values in some small and known set S. For example, they may be votes, where S = {0, 1},
or scores on an exam, where S = {0, 1, . . . , 100}. Mis-r security will thus not ensure security when
encrypting the type of data that actually arises in applications. This leads us to define mutual-
information security (mis) via
Advmis(E ;ChA) = max
M
I(M;ChA(E(M))) (2)
where the maximum is over all random variables M over {0, 1}m. This definition is what we call
message-distribution independent in that security is required regardless of how messages are dis-
tributed. In this way, distributions that arise in applications are captured.
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We remark that the importance of message-distribution independence of a metric was understood
by Shannon [42]. His definition of perfect privacy did not assume uniformly distributed messages or,
in fact, any particular distribution on messages, but held across all distributions. It is curious that
this feature was dropped in defining a security metric for the wiretap channel. We have resurrected it.
In cryptography, the importance of message-distribution independence has been understood since
[19] and is now ubiquitously viewed as necessary for a “good” definition. We will continue to require
message-distribution independence in our subsequent metrics.
In the wiretap literature it is sometimes argued that the assumption of uniformly distributed
messages is tenable because messages are compressed before transmission. But compression does not
result in uniformly distributed messages. Compression is a deterministic, injective function and does
not change the entropy.
At this point we have in mis a legitimate metric, but one whose underlying intuition is, at least for
cryptographers, obscure. Mis-security measures the difference in the number of bits required to encode
the message before and after seeing the ciphertext. Cryptographers have very different approaches
and intuition with regard to security and we now turn to definitions based on those.
3.4 Semantic security
We define the ss advantage via
Advss(E ;ChA) = max
f,M
(
max
A
Pr[A(ChA(E(M))) = f(M)]−max
S
Pr[S(m) = f(M)]
)
. (3)
The maximum is over all random variables M over {0, 1}m and all transforms f with domain {0, 1}m.
Think of the adversary A, given the adversary ciphertext ChA(E(M)), as trying to output some
function f of the message M. In the simplest case f is the identity function, so that the adversary is
trying to recover the message. However, figuring out partial information about the message (rather
than the entire message) should still be considered a violation of security. For example, the first bit
of the message could be a vote that we want to hide, which would be captured by letting f be the
function that returns the first bit of its input. To ensure that no partial information leaks, we allow
f to be any function.
The term Pr[A(ChA(E(M))) = f(M)], maximized over all adversaries, represents the maximum
possible probability that an adversary could output f(M) given ChA(E(M)). This by itself, however,
is not a measure of its success, because knowledge of f,M entails that the adversary has some a priori
probability of being able to output f(M) even if did not see the ciphertext. The subtracted term
accounts for this. It is the maximum, over all simulators S, of the probability Pr[S(m) = f(M)]
that the simulator can figure out f(M) given nothing but the length of the message and the implicit
knowledge of f,M represented by the order of quantification. A simulator is (recall) simply a transform,
the name chosen to allude to its role. The need to so adjust for a priori knowledge was recognized
by Shannon [42] in the context of perfect privacy and Goldwasser and Micali in their definition of
semantic security for public-key cryptosystems [19].
Finally, the outer maximum over f means that we require no partial information to leak, regardless
of message distribution.
This adversary-based formulation reflects the cryptographic approach and, with it, semantic se-
curity quite directly captures a strong and natural intuition, namely that you can’t compute any
function of the encrypted message with probability better than what you could guess if you never had
the ciphertext. Having written it this way, however, we now remark that it can be re-written using
information-theoretic quantities. Namely, we claim that
Advss(E ;ChA) = sup
f,M
(GP(f(M)|ChA(E(M))) −GP(f(M))) (4)
where the maximum is over all random variables M over {0, 1}m and all transforms f with domain
{0, 1}m. The proof that Equations (3) and (4) define the same quantities is left as an exercise.
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3.5 Distinguishing security
We define the ds advantage via
Advds(E ;ChA) = max
A,M0,M1
2Pr[A(M0,M1,ChA(E(Mb))) = b]− 1 (5)
= max
M0,M1
SD(ChA(E(M0));ChA(E(M1))) . (6)
In Eq. (5), b is a random variable uniformly distributed over {0, 1}. The maximization is over
all M0,M1 ∈ {0, 1}m (we stress these are strings, not random variables) and all adversaries A.
Pr[A(M0,M1,ChA(E(Mb))) = b] is the probability that adversary A, given m-bit messages M0,M1
and an adversary ciphertext emanating from Mb, correctly identifies the random challenge bit b. The
a priori success probability being 1/2, the advantage is appropriately scaled. This advantage is equal
to the statistical distance between the random variables ChA(E(M0)) and ChA(E(M1)) as per Eq. (6).
In this definition, one only considers the subclass of message distributions whose support is a set
of at most two equi-probable messages. Yet it will be equivalent to semantic security. The value of ds
is that it is easier to work with than ss yet equivalent to it.
4 Relations
We establish the relations summarized in Figure 2.
4.1 DS is equivalent to SS
The following says that SS and DS are equivalent up to a small constant factor. The proof is an
extension of the classical ones in computational cryptography.
Theorem 4.1 [DS↔ SS] Let E : {0, 1}m → {0, 1}c be an encryption algorithm and ChA an adversary
channel. Then Advss(E ;ChA) ≤ Advds(E ;ChA) ≤ 2 ·Advss(E ;ChA).
Proof: Let Ass be an adversary attacking the SS security of E ;ChA. We construct Ads attacking the
DS security of E ;ChA as follows. On inputs M0,M1 and adversary ciphertext C, adversary Ads runs
Ass on input C to get a value v. If v = f(M1) it outputs 1, else it outputs 0. Let M0,M1 be distributed
identically to M but independently of each other. Then
Pr[Ads(M0,M1,ChA(E(M1))) = 1] = Pr[Ass(ChA(E(M))) = f(M)]
Pr[Ads(M0,M1,ChA(E(M0))) = 1] ≤ max
S
Pr[S(m) = f(M)] .
Subtracting, we get
Pr[Ass(ChA(E(M))) = f(M)]−max
S
Pr[S(m) = f(M)]
≤ Pr[Ads(M0,M1,ChA(E(M1))) = 1]− Pr[Ads(M0,M1,ChA(E(M0))) = 1]
= 2Pr[Ads(M0,M1,ChA(E(Mb))) = b]− 1
≤ max
M0,M1
2Pr[Ads(M0,M1,ChA(E(Mb))) = b]− 1 .
Taking the max over all adversaries and all M yields Advss(E ;ChA) ≤ Advds(E ;ChA).
We now prove Advds(E ;ChA) ≤ 2 · Advss(E ;ChA). For any (wlog) distinct M0,M1 ∈ {0, 1}m let
MM0,M1 denote the random variable that is uniformly distributed over {M0,M1}. Then
1
2
Advds(E ;ChA) = max
M0,M1
max
Ads
(
Pr[Ads(M0,M1,ChA(E(Mb))) = b]− 1
2
)
= max
M0,M1
max
Ass
(
Pr[Ass(ChA(E(MM0,M1))) = MM0,M1 ]−max
S
Pr[S(m) = MM0,M1 ]
)
≤ Advss(E ;ChA) ,
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where the max is over all distinctM0,M1 ∈ {0, 1}m. This simply reflects the fact that on a distribution
over two distinct messages M0,M1, if b is random, finding b and finding Mb are equivalent tasks.
A corollary of this is that an encryption scheme E = {Ek}k∈N is (strongly) SS-secure relative to a
family of channels ChA = {ChAk}k∈N if and only if it is (respectively, strongly) DS-secure relative to
the same family of channels. We stress that Theorem 4.1, and this corollary, hold for all channels,
meaning channels specified by arbitrary transforms. This certainly includes binary channels such as
the one induced by the binary symmetric channel or other symmetric channels. However, it also
includes many other channels. An (implicit) assumption, however is that successive uses of the chan-
nel are independent, meaning if multiple messages are encrypted then the different uses of ChA are
independent.
The equivalence between DS and SS is helpful because DS is more analytically tractable than SS,
and we exploit it when we come to the design of solutions.
4.2 MIS versus DS
Neither direction of the equivalence between MIS and DS is trivial. Going back to Eq. (2), H(M)
is the minimum number of bits to encode a message from M and H(M |ChA(E(M))) is the minimum
number of bits to encode the message after seeing the ciphertext, so mi security measures the reduc-
tion in encoding length of messages allowed by seeing the ciphertext. It is not intuitively clear how
this encoding length intuition relates to statistical distance or semantic security. From the analytic
perspective, letting C = ChA(E(M)), the mutual information I(M;C) involved in Eq. (2) is
−
∑
M
Pr[M =M ] lg Pr[M =M ] +
∑
C
Pr[C = C]
∑
M
Pr[M =M |C = C] · lg Pr[M =M |C = C] .
This is a complex expression that looks quite different from statistical distance, in particular because
of the logarithms. Additionally we need to consider the maximum over M. We will first show that
MIS implies DS and then by an entirely different technique that DS implies MIS.
4.3 MIS implies DS
We begin by recalling that the KL divergence is a distance metric for probability distributions P,Q
defined by D(P ;Q) =
∑
x P (x) lg P (x)/Q(x). Let M,C be random variables. Probability distribu-
tions JM,C , IM,C are defined for all M,C by JM,C(M,C) = Pr [M =M,C = C ] and IM,C(M,C) =
Pr [M =M ] ·Pr [C = C ]. Thus JM,C is the joint distribution of M and C, while IM,C is the “indepen-
dent” or product distribution. The following lemma recasts mutual information in terms of the KL
divergence between the joint and independent distributions.
Lemma 4.2 Let M,C be random variables. Then I(M;C) = D(JM,C; IM,C).
The proof is standard and recalled for completeness in Appendix B.1. We have taken this path in the
hope of exploiting Pinsker’s inequality —from [38] with the tight constant from [12]— which lower
bounds the KL divergence between two distributions in terms of their statistical distance:
Lemma 4.3 [Pinsker’s Inequality] Let P,Q be probability distributions. Then D(P ;Q) ≥ 2 ·
SD(P ;Q)2.
At this point, from Lemmas 4.2 and 4.3, letting C = ChA(E(M)) denote the adversary ciphertext, we
have
Advmis(E ;ChA) = max
M
D(JM,CIM,C) ≥ 2 ·max
M
SD(JM,C; IM,C)
2 . (7)
We would now like to connect the RHS of Eq. (7) to Advds(E ;ChA) so as to lower bound the mis
advantage in terms of the ds advantage. (The upper bound will need a completely different approach,
Pinsker’s inequality being of no use for it.) It turns out that one can show that
max
M
SD(JM,C; IM,C) ≤ Advds(E ;ChA) . (8)
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This, inequality, unfortunately, goes the wrong way, in the sense that, combining it with Eq. (7) does
not lower bound mis in terms of ds. The observation that gets around this is that the inequality of
Eq. (8) becomes an equality when one restricts attention to M distributed uniformly over a set of two
messages. More precisely:
Lemma 4.4 LetM0,M1 ∈ {0, 1}m and let M be uniformly distributed over {M0,M1}. Let g: {0, 1}m →
{0, 1}c be a transform and let C = g(M). Then
SD(JM,C; IM,C) =
1
2
· SD(g(M0); g(M1)) .
Proof: We have
SD(JM,C; IM,C) =
1
2
∑
m,c
|JM,C(m, c)− IM,C(m, c)|
=
1
2
∑
m,c
∣∣PM(m) · PC|M=m(c) − PM(m) · PC(c)∣∣
=
1
2
∑
m
PM(m)
∑
c
∣∣PC|M=m(c)− PC(c)∣∣
=
1
2
∑
m
PM(m)
∑
c
∣∣∣∣∣PC|M=m(c)−
∑
m′
PC|M=m′(c) · PM(m′)
∣∣∣∣∣
=
1
2
∑
m
PM(m)
∑
c
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
m′
(PC|M=m(c)− PC|M=m′(c)) · PM(m′)
∣∣∣∣∣ .
So far we have not used the assumption that M takes only two values, each with probability 1/2. Let
α(m0) = m1 and α(m1) = m0. Then the sum over m
′ above has only one candidate non-zero term,
namely the one corresponding to m′ = α(m). So the above equals
1
2
∑
m
PM(m)
∑
c
∣∣(PC|M=m(c)− PC|M=α(m)(c)) · PM(α(m))∣∣
=
1
2
∑
m
1
2
∑
c
1
2
∣∣PC|M=M0(c) − PC|M=M1(c)∣∣
=
1
4
· 2 · 1
2
·
∑
c
∣∣PC|M=M0(c) − PC|M=M1(c)∣∣
=
1
2
· SD(PC|M=M0;PC|M=M1)
=
1
2
· SD(g(M0); g(M1)) .
This completes the proof.
Now we combine the lemmas to prove that MIS implies DS:
Theorem 4.5 [MIS→ DS] Let E : {0, 1}m → {0, 1}c be an encryption algorithm and ChA an adver-
sary channel. Then Advds(E ;ChA) ≤
√
2 ·Advmis(E ;ChA).
Proof: We have already applied Lemmas 4.2 and 4.3 to get Eq. (7). Now let M0,M1 ∈ {0, 1}m
be messages for which SD(ChA(E(M0));ChA(E(M1))) equals Advds(E ;ChA). Let M be uniformly
distributed over {M0,M1}. Since M is in the scope of the max in (7), we can apply Lemma 4.4 to see
that the RHS of Eq. (7) is at least
2 · SD(JM,C; IM,C)2 = 2 · 1
4
· SD(ChA(E(M0));ChA(E(M1))2 = 1
2
·Advds(E ;ChA)2 ,
where again C = ChA(E(M)).
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A corollary of Theorem 4.5 is that if an encryption scheme E = {Ek}k∈N is (strongly) MIS-secure
relative to a family of channels ChA = {ChAk}k∈N then it is also (respectively, strongly) DS-secure
relative to the same family of channels. Again, Theorem 4.5, and this corollary, hold for all channels,
not just binary ones. On the quantitative side, however, Theorem 4.5 says that s bits of mis security
imply (s− 1)/2 ≈ s/2 bits of ds security. We do not know whether this bound is tight.
4.4 DS implies MIS
The proof is underlain by the following general lemma that bounds the difference in entropy between
two distributions in terms of their statistical distance:
Lemma 4.6 Let P,Q be probability distributions. Let N = |supp(P ) ∪ supp(Q)| and ǫ = SD(P ;Q).
Then H(P )−H(Q) ≤ 2ǫ · lg(N/ǫ).
To prove this we need the following, which appears as Equation (16.24) in [11, Section 16.3]:
Lemma 4.7 Let p, x ∈ [0, 1/2] and assume p+ x ≤ 1/2. Then |h(p + x)− h(p)| ≤ h(x).
The following is similar to the proof of [11, Theorem 16.3.2].
Proof of Lemma 4.6: Let δ(y) = |P (y)/2 −Q(y)/2| ≤ 1/2 for all y. Then
H(P )−H(Q) =
∑
y
h(P (y))− h(Q(y)) =
∑
y
P (y) lg
1
P (y)
−Q(y) lg 1
Q(y)
=
∑
y
P (y) lg
1
P (y)/2
−Q(y) lg 1
Q(y)/2
= 2 ·
∑
y
P (y)
2
lg
1
P (y)/2
− Q(y)
2
lg
1
Q(y)/2
= 2 ·
∑
y
h(P (y)/2) − h(Q(y)/2) ≤ 2 ·
∑
y
|h(P (y)/2) − h(Q(y)/2)| .
If P (y) ≥ Q(y) then P (y)/2 + δ(y) = Q(y)/2 ≤ 1/2 so we can apply Lemma 4.7 to get
|h(P (y)/2) − h(Q(y)/2)| = |h(P (y)/2) − h(P (y)/2 + δ(y))| ≤ h(δ(y)) .
On the other hand if Q(y) ≥ P (y) then Q(y)/2 + δ(y) = P (y)/2 ≤ 1/2 so we can apply Lemma 4.7 to
get
|h(P (y)/2) − h(Q(y)/2)| = |h(Q(y)/2 + δ(y)) − h(Q(y)/2)| ≤ h(δ(y)) .
Continuing the above we have
H(P )−H(Q) ≤ 2 ·
∑
y
h(δ(y)) = 2 ·
∑
y
−δ(y) lg δ(y)
= 2ǫ ·
∑
y
−δ(y)
ǫ
lg δ(y) = 2ǫ ·
∑
y
−δ(y)
ǫ
lg
δ(y)
ǫ
− δ(y)
ǫ
lg ǫ
= 2ǫ ·
∑
y
h(δ(y)/ǫ) − 2ǫ ·
∑
y
δ(y)
ǫ
lg ǫ = 2ǫ ·
∑
y
h(δ(y)/ǫ) − 2 lg ǫ ·
∑
y
δ(y)
= 2ǫ ·
∑
y
h(δ(y)/ǫ) − 2ǫ lg ǫ ≤ 2ǫ · lgN − 2ǫ lg ǫ
= 2ǫ · lg N
ǫ
as claimed.
To exploit this, we define the pairwise statistical distance between random variables M,C via
PSD(M;C) = max
M0,M1
SD(PC|M=M0;PC|M=M1) ,
where the maximum is over all M0,M1 ∈ supp(PM). We now have:
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Lemma 4.8 Let M,C be random variables. Then SD(PC;PC|M=M) ≤ PSD(M;C) for any M .
Proof: We have
1
2
∑
c
∣∣PC|M=m(c) − PC(c)∣∣ = 12
∑
c
∣∣∣∣∣PC|M=m(c) −
∑
m′
PC|M=m′(c) · PM(m′)
∣∣∣∣∣
=
1
2
∑
c
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
m′
(PC|M=m(c)− PC|M=m′(c)) · PM(m′)
∣∣∣∣∣
≤ 1
2
∑
c
∑
m′
∣∣PC|M=m(c)− PC|M=m′(c)∣∣ · PM(m′)
=
1
2
∑
m′
PM(m
′)
∑
c
∣∣PC|M=m(c)− PC|M=m′(c)∣∣
≤
∑
m′
PM(m
′) ·PSD(M;C)
= PSD(M;C)
as claimed.
We now show that DS implies MIS.
Theorem 4.9 [DS→MIS] Let E : {0, 1}m → {0, 1}c be an encryption algorithm and ChA an adver-
sary channel. Let ǫ = Advds(E ;ChA). Then Advmis(E ;ChA) ≤ 2ǫ · lg(2c/ǫ).
Proof: Let f(x) = min(2x lg(2c/x), 1). Let C = ChA(E(M)) be the adversary ciphertext. Then
I(M;C) = I(C;M) = H(PC)−
∑
MPM(M) ·H(PC|M=M) =
∑
MPM(M) ·
(
H(PC)−H(PC|M=M)
)
.
Fix a message M such that H(PC) − H(PC|M=M) equals the maximum, over all M ′, of H(PC) −
H(PC|M=M ′) and let x = SD(PC;PC|M=M). From Lemma 4.6 and the above we get
I(M;C) ≤ H(PC)−H(PC|M=M) ≤ f(x) .
Let y = PSD(M;C). Lemma 4.8 says x ≤ y. The function f has the property that x ≤ y implies
f(x) ≤ f(y). So the above is at most f(y). Finally, take the maximum over all M on both sides.
We would like as a corollary of Theorem 4.9 to say that if an encryption scheme E = {Ek}k∈N is
(strongly) DS-secure relative to a family of channels ChA = {ChAk}k∈N then it is also (respectively,
strongly) MIS-secure relative to the same family of channels. Theorem 4.9 does not imply this for
all encryption schemes but it does usually. Let m, c be the message length and sender ciphertext
length of E . Let ǫ(k) = Advds(Ek;ChAk) and δ(k) = 2ǫ(k) lg(2c(k)/ǫ(k)). Usually m, c are bounded by
polynomials in k while ǫ(k) decreases exponentially in k. In this case, we have the desired conclusions.
We do under other conditions as well. The case where we would not is the unnatural one that c(k) is
extremely fast growing, for example exponential in k, yet ǫ(k) decreases no faster than exponentially.
We do not know whether the bound of Theorem 4.9 is tight. The following, however, says that
the bound of Lemma 4.6 is tight up to a constant factor. This means that improving the bound of
Theorem 4.9 would require a different approach.
Proposition 4.10 Let n > k ≥ 1 be integers. Let ǫ = 2−k and N = 1 + ǫ2n. Then there are
distributions P,Q with |supp(P ) ∪ supp(Q)| = N and SD(P ;Q) = ǫ and H(P ) −H(Q) ≥ 0.5 · ǫ ·
lg(N/ǫ).
Proof: Let S = {0, 1, . . . , N −1}. Let P,Q: S → [0, 1] be defined as follows. Let P (i) = 2−n for i ≥ 1
and P (0) = 1− ǫ. Let Q(i) = 0 for i ≥ 1 and Q(0) = 1. Then
SD(P ;Q) =
1
2
· (ǫ+ (N − 1) · 2−n) = 1
2
· (ǫ+ ǫ2n · 2−n) = ǫ .
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On the other hand
H(P )−H(Q) = (ǫ2n · h(2−n) + h(1 − ǫ))− h(1) = ǫn+ h(1 − ǫ) ≥ ǫn .
However
ǫ
2
· lg N
ǫ
=
ǫ
2
· lg 1 + ǫ2
n
ǫ
≤ ǫ
2
· lg 2ǫ2
n
ǫ
=
ǫ
2
· (n+ 1) ≤ ǫn
which proves the claim.
4.5 MIS-R does not imply DS
At this point we have justified all the numbered implication arrows in Figure 2. The un-numbered
implication MIS → MIS-R is trivial. Let us turn to the separation MIS-R 6→ MIS. To justify it
we need to exhibit an encryption scheme E and a family ChA of adversary channels such that E is
(strongly) MIS-R-secure relative to ChA but not (respectively, strongly) DS-secure relative to ChA.
This is easy to do with a contrived choice of ChA. (Have the channel faithfully transmit inputs 0m
and 1m and be very noisy on other inputs. Then MIS fails because the adversary has high advantage
when the message takes on only values 0m, 1m but MIS-R-security holds since these messages are
unlikely.) This however is not very convincing because of the obscure nature of the channel. We
will instead give an example where the channel is the binary symmetric one. The counter-example is
constructed by starting with a scheme that is MIS-R-secure (if none exists the separation question is
moot so we make the minimal assumption such a scheme exists) and then modifying it to a scheme
that retains MIS-R security but is not DS-secure.
Proposition 4.11 [MIS-R 6→ DS] Suppose 0 ≤ p < 1/2. Let E ′ = {E ′k}k∈N be an encryption
scheme with message length m satisfying m(k) ≥ k for all k ∈ N and with sender ciphertext length c′.
Assume it is (strongly) MIS-R-secure relative to {BSCc′(k)p }k∈N. Then there is an encryption scheme
E = {Ek}k∈N with message length m and sender ciphertext length c that is (respectively, strongly) MIS-
R-secure relative to {BSCc(k)p }k∈N but not (respectively, strongly) DS-secure relative to {BSCc(k)p }k∈N.
Furthermore, if E ′ is polynomial-time computable so is E and if E is (strongly) decryptable relative to
{BSCc′(k)p }k∈N then E is (respectively, strongly) decryptable relative to {BSCc(k)p }k∈N.
The final conditions regarding computability and decryptability are to ensure that we don’t “cheat”
by making E different from E ′ in some categorical way.
Proof of Proposition 4.11: Let n be an integer satisfying e−n(0.5−p)
2/2 < 1/4. Let c(k) = n+c′(k).
Let Ek(M) be defined by
If (M = 0m(k) OR M = 1m(k)) then a←M [1] else a←$ {0, 1}
C ′←$ E ′k(M)
Return an‖C ′
Recall bn denotes n copies of the bit b. The choice of n ensures that the probability that BSCnp (a
n)
has at least n/2 positions equal to a is at least 3/4 for any a ∈ {0, 1}. (Thus, an is a repetition-code
based encoding of a.) This allows a ds attack with messages M0 = 0
m(k) and M1 = 1
m(k) so that
Advds(Ek;BSCc(k)p ) ≥ 1/2. This implies E is certainly not DS-secure, let alone strongly DS-secure,
regardless of the security of E ′.
Now we want to show that E retains the assumed MIS-R security of E ′. The reason is that, if the
message is random, then the assumption m(k) ≥ k implies that it is very unlikely to be either 0m(k)
or 1m(k). But if M is not one of these messages then Ek(M) provides no more information about M
than E ′k(M). We can thus bound the increase in mis-r-advantage.
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Finally, polynomial-time computability is preserved by construction and decryptability because de-
cryption in the new scheme can be done by ignoring the first n bits of the receiver ciphertext and
decrypting the remainder as per the old scheme.
4.6 Settings in which MIS-R implies MIS
Above we saw that in general MIS-R does not imply MIS. Here we show that for certain types of
encryption schemes and channels, MIS-R does imply MIS. This is exploited in [29, 28].
Throughout this section, it is convenient to think of any randomized encryption function E :
{0, 1}m → {0, 1}c as a (deterministic) function {0, 1}r × {0, 1}m → {0, 1}c, where the first argument
takes the role of the random coins. We call E separable if
E(R,M) = E(R, 0m)⊕ E(0r,M) (9)
for all R ∈ {0, 1}r and M ∈ {0, 1}m. Also, E is message linear if the map E(0r, ·) : {0, 1}m → {0, 1}c
is linear, i.e.,
E(0r,M +M ′) = E(0r,M) + E(0r,M ′) (10)
for all M,M ′ ∈ {0, 1}m.
The following theorem states that for an encryption function which is message linear and sepa-
rable, MIS-R security implies MIS security when the adversarial channel is symmetric and operates
independently on ciphertext bits.
Theorem 4.12 [MIS-R → MIS] Let E : {0, 1}m → {0, 1}c be a separable and message-linear en-
cryption function, and let ChA : {0, 1} → {0, 1}ℓ be a symmetric channel. Then,
Advmis(E ;ChAc) ≤ Advmis-r(E ;ChAc) .
Before we turn to the the proof of Theorem 4.12, we first note that the combination of the
encryption function E : {0, 1}m → {0, 1}c and a channel ChAc implicitly yields a new channel
ChE : {0, 1}m → {0, 1}ℓ·c which, on input M ∈ {0, 1}m outputs ChAc(E(M)). Its output corre-
sponds to the adversarial view. The proof of Theorem 4.12 relies on the channel ChE being symmetric.
In particular, we need the following characterization of symmetric channels.
Lemma 4.13 Let Ch : {0, 1}m → {0, 1}ℓ be a channel. Assume that there exists a family {τM}M∈{0,1}m
of functions τM : {0, 1}ℓ → {0, 1}ℓ such that τ0m is the identity on {0, 1}ℓ, and moreover, for all
M,M ′ ∈ {0, 1}m, and Y ∈ {0, 1}ℓ,
τM⊕M ′(Y ) = τM(τM ′(Y )) , W [M ⊕M ′, Y ] =W [M, τM ′(Y )] . (11)
Then, Ch is symmetric.
Proof of Lemma 4.13: For every fixed M ∈ {0, 1}m, we observe that τM is self-inverse, since
τM (τM (Y )) = τM⊕M (Y ) = τ0m(Y ) = Y , and hence is a permutation on {0, 1}ℓ. Define the relation ∼
such that Y ∼ Y ′ if and only if there exists M ∈ {0, 1}m such that τM(Y ) = Y ′. It is easy to verify
that ∼ is an equivalence relation.
Let us now partition the columns of the transition matrix W so that two columns corresponding
to outputs Y, Y ′ ∈ {0, 1}ℓ are in the same sub-matrix if and only if Y ∼ Y ′. The induced sub-
matrices are strongly symmetric: On the one hand, for any two fixed M,M ′ ∈ {0, 1}m, W [M,Y ] =
W [M ′, τM⊕M ′(Y )] for all Y ∈ {0, 1}ℓ, and clearly τM⊕M ′(Y ) ∼ Y . On the other hand, for any fixed
Y ∼ Y ′ there exists M∗ ∈ {0, 1}, such that Y ′ = τM∗(Y ) and thus W [M,Y ] =W [M ⊕M∗, Y ′] for all
M ∈ {0, 1}m.
Proof of Theorem 4.12: We now provide a family of functions {τM}M∈{0,1}m as required in
Lemma 4.13 for the channel ChE : {0, 1}m → {0, 1}ℓ·c. As ChA : {0, 1} → {0, 1}ℓ is symmetric, its
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transition matrix can be decomposed into sub-matrices with the property that, for each sub-matrix,
there exist values p, q ∈ [0, 1] such that all columns are of the form [p, q]T or [q, p]T , and there is an equal
number of columns of each of the two types. Hence, there exists a permutation π1 : {0, 1}ℓ → {0, 1}ℓ
such that Pr [ChA(1) = y ] = Pr [ChA(0) = π1(y) ], and, moreover, π
−1
1 = π1. Therefore, with π0
being the identity, we have Pr [ChA(b) = y ] = Pr [ChA(0) = πb(y) ]. Also, it is easy to verify that
πb⊕b′ = πb ◦ πb′ for all b, b′ ∈ {0, 1}. In the same way, when considering c-bit inputs, we define a
permutation πX : {0, 1}ℓ·c → {0, 1}ℓ·c such that
πX(Y ) = (πX[1](Y [1]), . . . , πX[c](Y [c]))
for all X ∈ {0, 1}c. Then,
Pr [ChAc(X) = Y ] =
c∏
i=1
Pr [ChA(X[i]) = Y [i] ]
=
c∏
i=1
Pr
[
ChA(0) = πX[i](Y [i])
]
= Pr [ChAc(0c) = πX(Y ) ]
for all X ∈ {0, 1}c and Y ∈ {0, 1}ℓ·c. Consequently, πX⊕X′ = πX ◦πX′ for all X,X ′ ∈ {0, 1}c. We now
define, for all M ∈ {0, 1}m and Y ∈ {0, 1}ℓ·c,
τM (Y ) = πE(0r ,M)(Y ) .
In addition to τ0m being the identity (since E(0r, 0m) = 0c), using message linearity we verify that, for
all M,M ′ ∈ {0, 1}m,
τM⊕M ′ = πE(0r ,M⊕M ′) = πE(0r ,M)⊕E(0r ,M ′) = πE(0r ,M) ◦ πE(0r ,M ′) = τM ◦ τM ′ .
To conclude, with R being the r-bit randomness used by the encryption E ,
Pr
[
ChE(M ⊕M ′) = Y
]
=
∑
R∈{0,1}r
Pr [R = R ] · Pr [ChAc(E(R,M ⊕M ′)) = Y ]
=
∑
R∈{0,1}r
Pr [R = R ] · Pr [ChAc(0c) = πE(R,M⊕M ′)(Y ) ]
=
∑
R∈{0,1}r
Pr [R = R ] · Pr [ChAc(0c) = πE(R,M)⊕E(0r ,M ′)(Y ) ]
=
∑
R∈{0,1}r
Pr [R = R ] · Pr [ChAc(0c) = πE(R,M)(πE(0r ,M ′)(Y )) ]
=
∑
R∈{0,1}r
Pr [R = R ] · Pr [ChAc(E(R,M)) = πE(0r ,M ′)(Y ) ]
= Pr [ChE(M) = τM ′(Y ) ] .
Therefore, ChE is symmetric by Lemma 4.13.
To conclude the proof, we observe that for every symmetric channel Ch with m-bit inputs and every
m-bit random variable M,
I(M;Ch(M)) ≤ I(U;Ch(U))
where U is a uniformly distributed m-bit string (see e.g. [11, Theorem 7.2.1] for a proof). This implies
the theorem statement in the case where Ch = ChE .
Extensions. We do not know how to extend the above result to arbitrary symmetric channels with
multi-bit inputs, yet there are several natural channels ChA which for which MIS-R-security implies
MIS-security.
An (important) example is the channel ChA : {0, 1}c → {0, 1}c which, on input C ∈ {0, 1}c,
samples a fresh noise string E ∈ {0, 1}c according to some given noise distribution, and finally outputs
C⊕E. Provided E : {0, 1}r×{0, 1}m → {0, 1}c is separable and message linear, the combined channel
ChE is proven to be symmetric by defining τM such that τM (Y ) = E(0r,M) ⊕ Y for all M ∈ {0, 1}m
18
and Y ∈ {0, 1}c.
5 Achieving DS security
The broad question with regard to achieving security is the following. Let us fix a metric xs, a family
ChR of receiver channels and a family ChA of adversary channels. Is there an encryption scheme that
is decryptable relative to ChR while achieving XS-security relative to ChA?
This question has been examined in the I&C community when XS=MIS-R. The question of interest
has been to achieve (and determine) the optimal rate. Results tend to be non-constructive, proving
the existence of schemes but not providing explicit schemes, let alone ones that have polynomial time
encryption and decryption.
By introducing more demanding security metrics, we have upped the ante. We ask about the
achievability of DS (equivalently, SS, MIS). With a practical perspective, we seek not mere existence
results but explicit schemes with polynomial-time encryption and decryption. In this section we
present such schemes.
The rate of our schemes, although reasonable, is short of optimal. Subsequent work has tackled
the fundamental question of determining and achieving the optimal rate, showing, for a wide class
of receiver and adversary channels, that the optimal rate for DS security equals the MIS-R secrecy
capacity (meaning, the optimal rate for MIS-R security), and presenting schemes that achieve this
while having polynomial-time encryption and decryption [3].
The methods we use in this section are based on extractors. (More precisely, what in the cryp-
tographic literature are called strong randomness extractors.) For concreteness we use extractors
defined via universal hash functions and their analysis via the Leftover Hash Lemma [20] and its
generalizations [16, 15].
Direct use of extractors would, however provide security without error correction, yielding DS-
secure schemes when the receiver channel is the clear one. Adding error-correction is not as simple
as putting an ECC on top of an encryption that is secure when the receiver channel is the clear one
because the ECC helps the adversary. Our approach here is to reduce DS-security to a weaker security
requirement that we call rs-r security on an ECC. This is an adaption of the ideas of secure sketches
and fuzzy extractors from [16, 15].
5.1 Hash functions as extractors
A hash function is simply a two-argument function H: {0, 1}h × {0, 1}u → {0, 1}m. To every “name”
or description h ∈ {0, 1}h, we associate the function HH = H(H, ·): {0, 1}u → {0, 1}m, meaning
HH(U) = H(H,U) for all U ∈ {0, 1}u. We say that H is universal if for all distinct U1, U2 ∈ {0, 1}u
we have
Pr [H(H,U1) = H(H,U2) ] ≤ 2−m ,
where the probability is (only) over H ←$ {0, 1}h. We now give some concrete constructions.
The matrix-based construction H: {0, 1}h×{0, 1}u → {0, 1}m has h = um and views a description
H ∈ {0, 1}h as specifying a m by u matrix over GF2. It then lets H(H,U) = HU , where U is viewed
as a u by 1 matrix over GF2 and HU is matrix-vector multiplication, returning a 1 by m matrix over
GF2 that is regarded as an m-bit string.
When m ≤ u, a construction reducing the description length h from um to just u can be obtained
as follows. Identify {0, 1}ℓ with GF2ℓ for any ℓ. Fix a regular projection π: GF2u → GF2m , meaning
that every y ∈ GF2m has exactly 2u−m pre-images under π. The description H of a function is a point
H ∈ GF2u , and we let H(H,U) = π(HU). Here the multiplication is in GF2u . These are all standard
constructions whose universality is easily checked [43, Chapter 8].
The following generalization of the Leftover Hash Lemma of [20] was stated in [16, 15].
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Transform E(M)
H ←$ {0, 1}h ; U ←$ {0, 1}u
P ← H(H,U) ; W ← P⊕M
X ← En1(U)‖En2(H‖W )
Return X
Transform D(Y )
Y1‖Y2 ← C
U ← En1−1(Y1) ; H‖W ← En2−1(Y2)
P ←H(H,U) ; M ← P⊕W
Return M
Figure 3: On the left is the encryption function E = XtX[H,En1,En2]: {0, 1}m → {0, 1}n1+n2 as-
sociated to hash function H: {0, 1}h × {0, 1}u → {0, 1}m and ECCs En1: {0, 1}u → {0, 1}n1 and
En2: {0, 1}h+m → {0, 1}n2 by the XtX construction. On the right is the decryption function for a
channel ChR1‖ChR2 for which En1,En2 are, respectively, ECCs.
Lemma 5.1 [Generalized Leftover Hash Lemma] Let H : {0, 1}h × {0, 1}u → {0, 1}m be a uni-
versal hash function. Let U be a random variable over {0, 1}u. Let random variable H be uniformly
distributed over {0, 1}h. Let random variable V be uniformly distributed over {0, 1}m. Let Z be a
random variable. Assume (U,Z),H,V are independent. Then
SD((H,Z,H(H,U)); (H,Z,V)) ≤ 1
2
√
2m ·GP(U|Z) .
Above, Z may depend on U but the three random variables (U,Z),H,V must be independent.
5.2 The XtX construction
LetH: {0, 1}h×{0, 1}u → {0, 1}m be a hash function. Let En1: {0, 1}u → {0, 1}n1 and En2: {0, 1}h+m →
{0, 1}n2 be injective functions. These will later be instantiated by (the encoding functions of) ECCs.
The XtX (extract then xor) construction associates to H,En1,En2 the encryption function E =
XtX[H,En1,En2]: {0, 1}m → {0, 1}n1+n2 defined via Figure 3. The encryption function picks at ran-
dom a h-bit string H to specify hash function H(H, ·) as well as a random r-bit string U , and hashes
U under H(H, ·) to obtain a m-bit pad P . The latter is xored to the message M ∈ {0, 1}m to get W .
The sender ciphertext X includes W , but also includes H,X to enable decryption.
5.3 Overview
We will analyze XtX in a general setting. The only assumption made about the channel (whether
receiver or adversary) Ch: {0, 1}n1+n2 → {0, 1}d is that it is (n1, n2)-splittable, meaning the applica-
tions of the channel on En1(U) and on En2(H‖W ) are independent. The canonical setting is that both
the receiver and adversary channel are induced by binary channels, in which case they are certainly
(n1, n2)-splittable. The binary channels here may be symmetric but need not be. Within this general
setting, we look at decryptability and DS-security and establish the following:
• Say the receiver channel splits as ChR = ChR1‖ChR2. If En1 is a good ECC for ChR1 and En2
is a good ECC for ChR2 then XtX[H,En1,En2] is decryptable. (By “good” here we mean that
decoding is possible with low error.)
• Say the adversary channel splits as ChA = ChA1‖ChA2. DS-security of XtX[H,En1,En2] relative
to ChA makes no assumptions about ChR2 or En2, meaning holds for all choices of these. The
requirements will be that H is universal and that En1, viewed as an encryption function, provides
a certain weak security property, called rs-r (recovery security for random messages), relative to
ChA1. This asks that if U is uniformly distributed then it is hard to recover it from ChA1(En1(U)).
This notion and approach are inspired by the secure sketches of [16, 15].
Now, given a particular choice of receiver and adversary channels, we would pick En1,En2 to give
us the error-correction and security properties needed. To exemplify we will consider the case where
ChR,ChA are induced by binary channels and in particular the binary symmetric channel. For these
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cases we will provide bounds on the rs-r advantage of arbitrary ECCs. With this in hand, concrete
solutions emerge for these channels.
Both encryption and decryption will be polynomial-time assuming the codes have polynomial-time
encoding and decoding. The rate of XtX[H,En1,En2] depends on the choice of codes but even with
optimal choices is not itself optimal. It turns out that H, once chosen and transmitted, can be re-used
across multiple encryptions, playing the role of a seed in what in [3] is called a seeded-encryption
scheme, so, via amortization, it can be ignored from the point of view of rate. This increases the rate
but still leaves it short of optimal. We are not aware of any simple way to fill gap. A scheme with
optimal rate is given in [3] using alternative techniques.
5.4 Decryptability of XtX
Consider any receiver channel ChR that has the form ChR = ChR1‖ChR2 where ChR1: {0, 1}n1 →
{0, 1}d1 and ChR2: {0, 1}n2 → {0, 1}d2 . If En1,En2 are, respectively, good ECCs over ChR1,ChR2,
then XtX[H,En1,En2] will be decryptable over ChR. Decryption is performed as shown in Figure 3.
The first step parses receiver ciphertext Y into its first d1 bits Y1 and last d2 bits Y2. Decryption
(ie. decoding) algorithms for the ECCs are then applied, and the outputs again appropriately parsed.
Theorem 5.2 [Decryptability of XtX] Let H: {0, 1}h × {0, 1}u → {0, 1}m be a hash function.
Let En1−1: {0, 1}d1 → {0, 1}r be a decryption function for En1: {0, 1}u → {0, 1}n1 over channel
ChR1: {0, 1}n1 → {0, 1}d1 with decryption error δ1. Let En2−1: {0, 1}d2 → {0, 1}k+m be a decryption
function for En2: {0, 1}h+m → {0, 1}n2 over channel ChR2: {0, 1}n2 → {0, 1}d2 with decryption error
δ2. Let E = XtX[H,En1,En2]. Then D: {0, 1}d1+d2 → {0, 1}m as depicted in Figure 3 is a decryption
function for E with decryption error at most δ1 + δ2.
5.5 DS-security of XtX
Regard En1: {0, 1}u → {0, 1}n1 as an encryption function. We define recovery security for random
messages (rs-r) relative to channel ChA1: {0, 1}n1 → {0, 1}d1 via the advantage
Advrs-r(En1;ChA1) = GP(U|ChA1(En1(U))) = max
A
Pr[A(ChA1(En1(U))) = U]
where random variable U is uniformly distributed over {0, 1}u and the maximum is over all adversaries
A. As this shows the definition can either be expressed in terms of information-theoretic quantities (the
guessing probability) or using adversaries, and we will have occasion to exploit both representations.
Theorem 5.3 [DS-security of XtX] Let H : {0, 1}h × {0, 1}u → {0, 1}m be a universal hash func-
tion. Let En1: {0, 1}u → {0, 1}n1 and En2: {0, 1}h+m → {0, 1}n2 be injective functions. Let E =
XtX[H,En1,En2]. Let ChA1: {0, 1}n1 → {0, 1}d1 and ChA2: {0, 1}n2 → {0, 1}n2 be channels. Let
ChA = ChA1‖ChA2. Then
Advds(E ;ChA) ≤
√
2m ·Advrs-r(En1;ChA1) .
The bound does not depend on ChA2,En2, reflecting that security is independent of the choice of
these. The proof will use the following standard lemma.
Lemma 5.4 Let X1,X2 be random variables and let f1, f2 be transforms. Then SD(f1(X1); f2(X2)) ≤
SD(X1;X2).
Given this we proceed to prove Theorem 5.3.
Proof of Theorem 5.3: Let M0,M1 ∈ {0, 1}m. Let U,H,V be uniformly and independently
distributed random variables, the first over {0, 1}u, the second over {0, 1}h and the third over {0, 1}m.
Let Z = ChA1(En1(U)). For c ∈ {0, 1} let Wc = ChA2(En2(H‖H(H,U)⊕Mc)). Let
δ(M0,M1) = SD((Z,W0); (Z,W1))
ǫ(M0,M1) = SD((H,Z,H(H,U)⊕M0); (H,Z,H(H,U)⊕M1)) .
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Lemma 5.4 implies that regardless of the choices of En2 and ChA2 we have
δ(M0,M1) ≤ ǫ(M0,M1) .
We will now show that
ǫ(M0,M1) ≤
√
2m ·Advrs-r(En1;ChA1) . (12)
Since M0,M1 were arbitrary, this proves the theorem.
Towards proving (12), let
ǫ1(M0,M1) = SD((H,Z,H(H,U)⊕M0); (H,Z,V⊕M0))
ǫ2(M0,M1) = SD((H,Z,V⊕M0), (H,Z,V⊕M1))
ǫ3(M0,M1) = SD((H,Z,V⊕M1), (H,Z,H(H,U)⊕M1)) .
By the triangle inequality we have
ǫ(M0,M1) ≤ ǫ1(M0,M1) + ǫ2(M0,M1) + ǫ3(M0,M1) .
However, ǫ2(M0,M1) = 0 because V is uniformly distributed over {0, 1}m andM0,M1 ∈ {0, 1}m. Also,
ǫ1(M0,M1) = ǫ3(M0,M1) = SD((H,Z,H(H,U)), (H,Z,V)) .
We conclude by applying Lemma 5.1.
5.6 XtX over a BSC
We can apply the above general framework and results to provide concrete DS-secure encryption
schemes for particular channels. We illustrate here for the case of the binary symmetric channel. We
begin for simplicity with the case that the receiver channel is error-free and then move on to the case
where it is not.
Assume the receiver channel is error-free. In this case we can set En1 = Idu and En2 = Idh+m
to identity functions. Rs-r advantages are now easy to bound. In the case of the binary symmetric
channel we have the following:
Proposition 5.5 Suppose 0 ≤ p ≤ 1/2 and let ChA = BSCup . Then
Advrs-r(Idu;ChA) = (1− p)u . (13)
Proof: Letting random variable U be uniformly distributed over {0, 1}u we have
GP(U|BSCup(U)) =
∑
z
Pr[BSCup(U) = z] ·maxx Pr[U = x|BSC
u
p(U) = z]
=
∑
z
Pr[BSCup(U) = z] · Pr[U = z|BSCup(U) = z]
=
∑
z
Pr[BSCup(U) = z] · (1− p)u
=
∑
z
2−u · (1− p)u
= (1− p)u ,
establishing (13).
By combining Theorem 5.3 and Proposition 5.5 we get the following concrete bound for DS-security
of XtX encryption in the case the receiver channel is error-free and the adversary channel is a binary
symmetric one:
Theorem 5.6 Let H : {0, 1}h × {0, 1}u → {0, 1}m be a universal hash function. let E = XtX[H, Idu,
Idh+m]. Suppose 0 ≤ p ≤ 1/2 and let ChA = BSCu+h+mp .
Advds(E ;ChA) ≤
√
2m · (1− p)u .
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Now let us consider the case where the receiver channel is not error-free. En1,En2 would now be
chosen to correct errors over the receiver channel. Taking them as given, we need to bound the rs-r
advantage of the former. For the case where the adversary channel is a binary symmetric one we have
the following:
Proposition 5.7 Let En1: {0, 1}u → {0, 1}u+r be an injective function. Suppose 0 ≤ p ≤ 1/2 and let
ChA = BSCu+rp . Then
Advrs-r(En1;ChA) ≤ 2r(1− p)u+r . (14)
Proof: Let Z = ChA(En1(U) where random variable U is uniformly distributed over {0, 1}u. Then we
have
GP(U|Z) =
∑
z
Pr[Z = z] ·max
x
Pr [ U = x | Z = z ]
=
∑
z
Pr[Z = z] ·max
x
Pr [ Z = z | U = x ] Pr[U = x]
Pr[Z = z]
=
∑
z
max
x
Pr [ Z = z | U = x ] · 2−u
≤
∑
z
2−u(1− p)u+r
= 2r(1− p)u+r ,
which proves the Proposition.
From Theorem 5.3 and the above we directly obtain the following:
Theorem 5.8 Let H : {0, 1}h × {0, 1}u → {0, 1}m be a universal hash function. Let En1: {0, 1}u →
{0, 1}u+r and En2: {0, 1}h+m → {0, 1}n2 be injective functions. Let E = XtX[H,En1,En2]. Suppose
0 ≤ p ≤ 1/2 and let ChA = BSCu+r+n2p . Then
Advds(E ;ChA) ≤
√
2m+r · (1− p)u+r .
5.7 Numerical estimates
In usage, we would imagine the user or system designer wanting to create a scheme that encrypts
messages of a certain desired length m and achieves a certain desired number of bits s of DS-security
under the assumption that the adversary channel is a BSC with a certain, given crossover probability
p. Our job, given m, s, p, is to provide the scheme. The above allows us to do so. To illustrate, let
us for simplicity consider the case where the receiver channel is error-free, so that E = XtX[H, Idu,
Idh+m]. Our task amounts to picking H so that Advds(E ;BSCup) ≤ 2−s. Theorem 5.6 says that it
suffices to let
u =
⌈
2s+m
α
⌉
where α = lg
1
1− p .
We can then use one of the constructions of H: {0, 1}h×{0, 1}u → {0, 1}m given above. The amortized
rate of the scheme is
Rate(E) = m
u+m
=
αm
2s +m+ αm
which is
Rate(E) = α
1 + α
in the limit as m → ∞. By the amortized rate we mean that we ignore H with the understanding
that it can be chosen and transmitted just once, all subsequent encryptions using the same H, so the
amortized rate does not depend on h.
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p 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1
Rate(E) 0.5 0.42 0.34 0.24 0.13
Rate2(E) 1 0.74 0.51 0.32 0.15
Figure 4: For various values of the crossover probability p of the adversary BSC, we show the limiting
amortized rate and dual-channel limiting amortized rate achievable by XtX[H, Idu, Idh+m].
We note another improvement. As we saw above, security is not affected by ChA2, the channel over
which W is sent. (We have already sent H upfront, so only W goes over this channel.) The sender
could thus transmit W separately over a clear channel. The adversary would be in full possession
of W but security is not reduced. The advantage is that transmission in a way that renders the
adversary’s reception noisy is much more expensive than transmission in the clear, and sending W
becomes essentially for free. Let us refer to this as the dual-channel setting and let Rate2 denote the
corresponding rate, which is
Rate2(E) = m
u
=
αm
2s+m
.
In the limit as m→∞ this is
Rate2(E) = α .
In Figure 4 we illustrate, showing, for a few choices of p the corresponding rates. The rate obviously
decreases with p but the salient fact is that we can get security for any positive value of p, even if the
rate is quite low.
We note yet another improvement, namely that the 1 − p term in Theorems 5.6 and 5.8 can be
replaced with 1−2p+p2 by using a version of Lemma 5.1 in which the guessing probability is replaced
by a collision probability. Our numbers do not reflect this.
5.8 Reduction to error-free channels
Above we applied Theorem 5.3 in the case where the adversary channel is the binary symmetric one.
Here we look into applying it for other channels.
In general En1 is chosen to correct errors over the receiver channel, and it may be hard to bound its
rs-r advantage. But in the case that the receiver channel is error-free, En1 is just the identity function
Idu, and bounding rs-r advantage should be much easier, as we saw above. Here we aim to generalize
this approach. For a wide class of adversary channels and choices of En1, we will show how to reduce
the problem of bounding the rs-r advantage of En1 over the given channel to the problem of bounding
the rs-r advantage of Idu over the same channel. This effectively makes security independent of the
details of the ECCs. More specifically, what we show is that for systematic codes (most codes are
systematic or can be made so), and for appropriately splittable adversary channels (all binary channels
fall in this category), the rs-r security of the code over the given channel depends only on the amount
of redundancy in the code and the rs-r security of the identity function over the same channel.
Let us now proceed to the details. An ECC En1: {0, 1}u → {0, 1}n1 is systematic if there is a
redundancy function Rd: {0, 1}u → {0, 1}n1−u such that En1(U) = U‖Rd(U) for all U ∈ {0, 1}u. Then
we have the following:
Theorem 5.9 Let En1: {0, 1}u → {0, 1}u+r be a systematic ECC with redundancy function Rd:
{0, 1}u → {0, 1}r. Let Chu: {0, 1}u → {0, 1}a and Chr: {0, 1}r → {0, 1}b be channels, and let ChA1 =
Chu‖Chr: {0, 1}u+r → {0, 1}a+b. Then
Advrs-r(En1;ChA1) ≤ 2r ·Advrs-r(Idu;Chu) . (15)
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In the case that ChA is the binary symmetric channel, we could combine Proposition 5.5 and The-
orem 5.9 to bound the rs-r advantage of a given En1 assuming it was systematic. Specifically, if
En1: {0, 1}u → {0, 1}u+r is a systematic ECC and ChA = BSCu+rp then we would getAdvrs-r(En1;ChA)
≤ 2r(1 − p)u. This is not as good a bound as Proposition 5.7. In the case of BSCs, Theorem 5.9 is
thus not as effective as a direct analysis. But it is more general, and for channels other than BSCs it
may be hard to directly analyze rs-r security of En1. In this case Theorem 5.9 will be helpful.
To prove Theorem 5.9 we first need a few definitions and lemmas. If Ch1: D1 → R1 and Ch2: D2 →
R2 are channels with R1 ⊆ D2 then their composition Ch = Ch2 ◦ Ch1 is the channel Ch: D1 → R2
defined by Ch(x) = Ch2(Ch1(x)) for all x ∈ D1. We say that channel Ch3 is a degradation of channel
Ch1 if there is a channel Ch2 such that Ch3 = Ch2 ◦ Ch1.
Lemma 5.10 Let En1: {0, 1}u → {0, 1}n1 be a function. Let Ch1: {0, 1}n1 → {0, 1}c and Ch2:
{0, 1}c → {0, 1}d1 be channels and let Ch = Ch2 ◦ Ch1. Then
Advrs-r(E ;Ch) ≤ Advrs-r(E ;Ch1) (16)
Proof: Let random variable U be uniformly distributed over {0, 1}u. It suffices to show that
max
A
Pr[A(Ch(En1(U))) = U] ≤ max
B
Pr[B(Ch1(En1(U))) = U] . (17)
To show this, let A be any adversary. We define adversary BA via BA(Z) = A(Ch2(Z)) for all Z.
Then for any A we have
Pr[A(Ch(En1(U))) = U] = Pr[BA(Ch1(En1(U))) = U] . (18)
Now take the max over all A of both sides of (18) to get
max
A
Pr[A(Ch(En1(U))) = U] = max
A
Pr[BA(Ch1(En1(U))) = U]
≤ max
B
Pr[B(Ch1(En1(U))) = U] ,
the last inequality because the max over all B includes those of the form BA .
The following lemma about guessing probabilities is a corollary of [15, Lemma 2.2] but for completeness
we give a direct proof.
Lemma 5.11 Let X,R,Z be random variables such that R takes on at most N ≥ 1 values. Then
GP(X|Z,R) ≤ N ·GP(X|Z) . (19)
Proof: We have
GP(X|Z,R) =
∑
r,z
Pr[R = r,Z = z] · f(r, z) (20)
where
f(r, z) = max
x
Pr [ X = x | R = r,Z = z ]
= max
x
Pr[X = x,R = r,Z = z]
Pr[R = r,Z = z]
= max
x
Pr[X = x,R = r|Z = z] · Pr[Z = z]
Pr[R = r|Z = z] · Pr[Z = z]
= max
x
Pr[X = x,R = r|Z = z]
Pr[R = r|Z = z]
≤ max
x
Pr[X = x|Z = z]
Pr[R = r|Z = z] . (21)
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From (20) and (21) we have
GP(X|Z,R) ≤
∑
r,z
Pr[R = r,Z = z] ·max
x
Pr[X = x|Z = z]
Pr[R = r|Z = z]
=
∑
r,z
Pr[R = r|Z = z] · Pr[Z = z] ·max
x
Pr[X = x|Z = z]
Pr[R = r|Z = z]
=
∑
r,z
Pr[Z = z] ·max
x
Pr[X = x|Z = z]
=
∑
r
GP(X|Z)
≤ N ·GP(X|Z) .
This concludes the proof.
Now we proceed to prove Theorem 5.9.
Proof of Theorem 5.9: ChA1 = Chu‖Chr is a degradation of Chu‖Idr hence by Lemma 5.10 we
have
Advrs-r(En1;Ch) ≤ Advrs-r(En1;Chu‖Idr) .
We proceed to upper bound the latter and thereby establish (15) as follows:
Advrs-r(En1;Chu‖Idr) = GP(U|Chu(U),Rd(U)) (22)
≤ 2r ·GP(U|Chu(U)) (23)
= 2r ·Advrs-r(Idu;Chu) .
Since En1 is systematic with redundancy function Rd we have En1(U) = U‖Rd(U), which justifies (22).
Random variable R = Rd(U) takes on at most 2r values. Let X = U and Z = Chu(U) and apply
Lemma 5.11 to get (23).
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A Related Work
This section provides a comprehensive survey of the large body of work related to wiretap security,
and more broadly, to information-theoretic secure communication in a noisy setup.
The wiretap setting and the secrecy capacity. For sake of clarity in comparing existing
results, it is convenient to consider two different variants of the notion of secrecy capacity addressed
by the wiretap literature. Given a pair of channels (ChR,ChA), their weak secrecy capacity Cw is the
supremum of the rates achievable by pairs (E ,D) consisting of an encryption scheme E = {Ek}k∈N
and a decryption scheme D = {Dk}k∈N for E and ChR such that, first, the decoding requirement is
satisfied, i.e.,
lim
k→∞
DE(Ek;Dk;ChR) = 0 .
and moreover,
lim
k→∞
Advres(Ek;ChA)
k
= 0 , (24)
a property which we refer to as weak security in the following. Additionally, the strong secrecy capacity
Cs ≤ Cw is obtained where we restrict the supremum over those schemes achieving RES security, i.e.,
lim
k→∞
Advres(Ek;ChA) = 0 , (25)
It should be noted that both these quantities exhibit some drawbacks making them less appealing to
cryptographers: First, the supermum is taken over schemes that are not necessarily computationally
efficient. Moreover, both definitions only consider uniformly distributed messages. Finally, the privacy
requirement of Cw, i.e., weak security, permits complete leakage of a k
1−ǫ plaintext bits, which is almost
always unacceptable. In fact, cryptographic applications call for an even stronger capacity notion
where Advds(Ek;ChA) is a negligible function in k (e.g., 2−Θ(k)), and that this rate is achievable by an
efficiently implementable scheme. Our main technical result can be interpreted as showing that such
stringent capacity notion is not smaller than Cw for many settings of interest, and it attained by an
efficient and explicit scheme, which we provide.
Earlier work on the secrecy capacity. The wiretap scenario was first considered by Wyner [45],
who provided a full characterization of Cw in the special case where ChA is a degraded version of ChR,
i.e., such that there exists a transform T with T ◦ChR = ChA, where the composition operator ◦ is the
straightforward generalization of function composition to randomized transforms. Wyner’s result was
later generalized by Csisza´r and Ko¨rner [13], who showed2 that for arbitrary channels ChR : X → Y
and ChA : X → Z,
Cw = max
U,X
[I(U;ChR(X))− I(U;ChA(X))] ,
where the maximum is over all pairs of correlated random variables U and X, with the latter variable
taking values from the channel domain. If both ChR and ChA are symmetric, the above simplifies to
(cf. e.g. [26] for a proof)
Cw = H(U|ChA(U))−H(U|ChR(U)) (26)
where U is uniform on X. Therefore, in the most common setting of ChR = BSCpR and ChA = BSCpA
(for pR < pA), (26) yields Cw = h2(pA) − h2(pR). Finally, we note that more recently, Bloch and
Laneman [6] have extended these results to the strong secrecy capacity Cs. Their work also considered
other capacity measures related to security metrics different than those considered in this paper;
however, all of these notions only cover random-input adversaries.
We stress that all aforementioned results are inherently non-explicit: That is, existence of secrecy-
capacity achieving schemes is proven via the probabilistic method, and the resulting scheme is neither
2Csisza´r and Ko¨rner actually considered a general setting where the outputs of ChR and ChA are correlated. However,
we note that as long as communication is one-way, such correlation is irrelevant and one treats both (marginal) channels
individually for correct decription and for security, respectively.
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explicitly given, nor it is guaranteed to be efficient. In fact, to date, only a handful of efficient schemes
are known.
Wiretap channel II. Ozarow and Wyner [37] also considered an alternative to the above wiretap
setting (called the wiretap channel II) where ChR is noiseless, but at the same time, Eve can learn a
fraction δ of the bits sent over ChR, and does not learn anything about the reamining (1− δ) fraction.
Solutions were presented relying on error-correcting codes [37, 44]. Also, the notable work of [10]
noted the such protocols with good parameters can be built from primitives such as deterministic
randomness extractors for symbol-fixing sources with efficient inversion [23], as well as from k-wise in-
dependent functions [25] and related tools from exposure-resilient cryptography, such as all-or-nothing
transforms [8, 17].
Information-theoretic key agreement. A technically and conceptually related line of work
considers the setting of information-theoretically secure key agreement from noisy primitives where
Alice and Bob can additionally interact via a noiseless public channel. The typical question is to study
the secret-key rate, i.e., the maximal achievable ratio by a secret-key agreement scheme between the
number of uses of the noisy primitive and the number key bits geneated by the protocol. (In general,
there is no bound on the amount of communication over the public channel.) Note that key agreement
and encryption are equivalent in this setting.
Maurer [30] introduced the problem and first showed that in Wyner’s wiretap setting with ChR =
BSCpR and ChA = BSCpA , a higher secret-key rate h2(pR+ pA− 2pRpA)−h2(pR) is achievable than in
the pure wiretap setting. He later generalized [31] the question to a setting where Alice, Bob, and Eve
are given each independent samples of random variables X,Y, and Z, respectively. This seminal work
was followed by several results following different directions, such as improving techniques used in these
protocols [4, 7, 40], understanding the achievable secret-key rates in different settings [34, 39, 21] as well
as extending to a setting where the channel between Alice and Bob is not authentic [33, 35, 24, 18, 9].
We also note that many of the tools developed in this area found interesting applications in the
context of cryptography based on biometrics (starting from [15]).
Other wiretap models. We note that there is an active area of research aimed at understanding
the secrecy and the secret-key capacities in even more settings, such as bi-directional wiretap settings
(cf. e.g. [1]), multi-party settings, and channels with continous noise. We refer the reader e.g. to [5]
for a survey of these results.
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B Proofs for Section 4
B.1 Proof of Lemma 4.2
Proof: We have
I(M;C) = −
∑
m
PM(m) lgPM(m) +
∑
c
PC(c)
∑
m
PM|C=c(m) lgPM|C=c(m)
= −
∑
m,c
JM,C(m, c) lg PM(m) +
∑
c
JM,C(m, c)
∑
m
lgPM|C=c(m)
= −
∑
m,c
JM,C(m, c) ·
(
lgPM(m)− lgPM|C=c(m)
)
= −
∑
m,c
JM,C(m, c) · lg PM(m)
PM|C=c(m)
=
∑
m,c
JM,C(m, c) · lg
PM|C=c(m)
PM(m)
=
∑
m,c
JM,C(m, c) · lg
JM,C(m, c)
PM(m) · PC(c)
= D(JM,C; IM,C)
as desired.
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